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In recent years, Latin American banking sectors have experienced an 
accelerated process of concentration and foreign penetration that has 
prompted diverse views regarding its implications for the competitive 
behavior of banks and for the financial stability of the system as a whole. 
Exploiting a rich bank-level balance sheet database for eight Latin 
American countries, we examine the evolution of concentration and 
foreign penetration indicators and their impact on competition and risk. 
We find that, while concentration did not reduce competition in the 
industry, foreign penetration appears to have led to less competitive 
banking sectors. Moreover, we find banking sector fragility to be 
positively related to competition and, through this channel, negatively 
related to foreign participation, despite the fact that foreign banks in the 
region are associated with higher insolvency risk due to higher leverage 
ratios and more volatile returns. 
 
                                                       
1 The authors are grateful to César Serra and Luciana Moscoso for their invaluable research assistance, and 
to participants in the First IDB/OECD Latin American Competition Forum for their useful comments on an 
earlier draft.   5  6
1. Introduction 
 
The last decade witnessed important changes in the banking industry in most Latin 
American countries. While foreign bank participation more than doubled in many cases 
(Figure 1), banking concentration increased (Figure 2), mainly due to a process of 
consolidation (Table 1) led by mergers that in many instances were triggered by financial 
crises and regulatory tightening.
2 These twin developments have raised concerns about 
(and elicited diverging views on) their impact on competition (in particular, borrowing 
costs and banking efficiency) and financial stability. The purpose of this study is to assess 
whether and how the consolidation and internationalization processes have affected the 
competitive environment and the stability of the banking sectors in the region.  
Despite the general belief that bank consolidation generates a more concentrated 
system and, as a consequence, a less competitive one, there is no clear analytical 
argument supporting this view in the literature.
3 For example, a merger between firms 
serving overlapping or identical markets reduces competition and increases efficiency by 
eliminating duplication of activities. Alternatively, it is not at all clear whether 
competition and concentration should go in opposite directions. Elimination of branching 
restrictions, or widespread use of automated teller machines (ATMs) that reduces 
geographical barriers can be shown to enhance, rather than hinder, banking competition, 
while inducing consolidation as a result of narrower margins.
4 At any rate, a wide range 
of studies that analyze the US and EU experiences conclude that mergers seem to have 
been pro-competitive in general.
5  
The impact of consolidations and concentration on system stability is also an open 
question. From a theoretical point of view, competition may have a deleterious impact on 
stability if it causes banks’ charter value to drop, thus reducing the incentives for prudent 
risk-taking behavior. According to this view, the promise of extraordinary profits 
                                                       
2 Regulatory tightening tended to affect proportionally smaller (and more specialized) institutions. 
3 Surveys of the analytical literature can be found in Kroszner (1998), Carletti, Hartmann and Spagnolo 
(2002), Yanelle (1997), Scholtens (2000) and Canoy, van Dijk, Lemmen et al. (2001).  
4 See Matutes and Vives (2000) and Cordella and Levy Yeyati (2002) for an analytical discussion along 
these lines. The increase in concentration as a result of the elimination of branching restrictions in the U.S. 
is studied, e.g., in Economides, Hubbard and Palia (1995). See also Schargrodsky and Sturzenegger (2000) 
for a related study of the Argentine banking sector.  
5 For the US case, see Kroszner (1998), Avery, Bostic and Samolyk (1998), Kroszner and Strahan (1998), 
and Strahan and Weston (1996). For the EU case, see Vives (2001).   7
associated with the presence of market power reduces the agency problem of limited 
liability banks (namely, their propensity to gamble). Stiffer competition, instead, could 
lead to more aggressive risk taking, as documented in some empirical studies.
6 On the 
other hand, a more concentrated system, inasmuch as it implies the presence of a few 
relatively large banks, is more likely to display a “too big to fail” problem by which large 
banks increase their risk exposure anticipating the unwillingness of the regulator to let the 
bank fail in the event of insolvency problems (Hughes and Mester, 1998).  
As noted, and unlike the case of financial centers like the U.S. or EMU, banking 
sector consolidation in Latin America appears to have been based to a large extent on the 
acquisition of local banks by bigger foreign institutions, a process underscored by 
episodes of financial distress and in part related to the lower perceived vulnerability of 
foreign banks to financial shocks.
7 The  impact of foreign banks on banking sectors in the 
region is still under discussion.  
Claessens, Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2001), for example, find that, in 
developing countries, the presence of foreign banks is typically associated with higher net 
interest margins and higher profitability than domestic banks. In addition, they find that 
foreign banks have higher overhead costs, contradicting the hypothesis that foreign 
banks’ profitability is driven by efficiency.
8 Cull and Clarke (1998) find that, for 
Argentina, domestic banks’ performance is negatively correlated with their relative 
exposure to manufacturing, where foreign banks have been particularly active, and argue 
that foreign competition has inflicted a negative shock on domestic bank profitability. In 
this case, as well as in the previous one, identifying efficiency effects is difficult, as 
measures of bank services cannot be adjusted for factors such as difference in quality or 
transient versus permanent effects. 
Regarding the link between foreign penetration and financial stability, Demirgüç-
Kunt and Detragiache (1998) find that, other things equal, the presence of foreign banks 
is associated with a lower probability of financial crisis. This finding, again, is open to 
                                                       
6 See Cerasi and Daltung (2000), Keeley (1990), Bergtresser (2001), Carletti, Hartmann and Spagnolo 
(2002). 
7 Indeed, during episodes of financial turmoil, it is common to observe a flight to quality that tends to result 
in a larger concentration of deposits in foreign-owned banks.   8
more than one interpretation. On the one hand, foreign penetration may be simply 
capturing a market liberalization effect, namely, the fact that highly protected banking 
sectors generate inefficient institutions and substandard regulation and supervision. On 
the other hand, if foreign-owned banks forestall liquidity shocks as a result of being 
better aided by their highly capitalized parents, a country with an internationalized 
banking sector may be partially isolated from bank runs, irrespectively of the risk-taking 
behavior of their foreign-owned institutions. Indeed, the presence of foreign banks may 
act as insurance preventing a bank run in the first place. 
In this paper, we exploit a rich bank-level balance sheet and income database for 
eight Latin American countries to revisit these issues.
9 We estimate a competitive 
behavior parameter on a yearly basis to test whether and how competition changes relate 
to changes in concentration and foreign participation. We conclude that, while there is no 
evidence that concentration significantly reduced competition in the industry, foreign 
penetration appears to have led to a less competitive environment, a finding further 
confirmed by a positive link between foreign penetration and bank profits.  
On the other hand, in terms of banking sector stability, we find that, while 
increased concentration again appears to have had virtually no influence on bank 
insolvency risk, the latter is positively related with competition, and through this channel, 
with increased foreign participation, despite the fact that foreign banks in our sample 
exhibit higher risk indicators due to higher leverage ratios and more volatile returns. 
The plan of the paper is the following. Section 2 describes the data and the 
estimation of the competition indicator, and presents related econometric results. Section 
3 moves to banking fragility issues, addresses the link between competition, 
concentration and internationalization, on the one hand, and bank insolvency risk, on the 
other. Section 4 concludes. 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
8 They attribute this to the fact that recent entrants have to incur an additional cost to make up for 
incumbent advantages and gain a reasonable market share. At any rate, the previous findings suggests that, 
at least in the short run, cost efficiencies are not likely to be visible.  
9 The sample includes all banks for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Mexico  
and Peru. The source is, in all cases, the national central bank.   9
2. The Data 
 
In this paper, we use a detailed balance sheet database comprising the banking sector of 
eight Latin American countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, El 
Salvador, Mexico and Peru. The source, in all cases, is the national central bank or the 
superintendency of banks, when autonomous.
10 
 
Measures of Concentration and Foreign Penetration 
 
While there is a wide array of concentration measures proposed in the industrial 
organization literature,
11 hardly any of them have been used in the empirical banking 
literature with the exception of the k-firm concentration ratio (CRk) and the Herfindahl-
Hirschman index (HHI).
12 For the sake of comparability, in this paper we use these two 
measures (CR3 and CR5 in the case of the concentration ratio) based on total bank assets.
13 
In turn, we measure foreign penetration as the foreign-owned to total asset ratio 
(FASSETS), where foreign banks are defined as those controlled by institutions with 
headquarters in developed countries.
14 
 
Measures of Competition 
 
The literature on the measurement of competition can broadly be divided into two 
branches: the (non-formal) structural approach and the (formal) non-structural approach.
15 
The structural approach centers on the Structure-Conduct-Performance paradigm (SCP) 
                                                       
10 See Appendix for variable descriptions and sources. 
11 For a survey, see Bikker and Haaf (2001a) and Shaffer (1992). 

















where i is an index that orders banks from largest to smallest, and si is the market share of bank i, (typically 
measured in terms of total assets). 
13 In addition, we computed the concentration measures also for a subset of markets (private deposits, 
private credit, mortgage loans and consumer loans). As expected, concentration indicators in different 
markets are highly correlated, with the salient exception of mortgage, which in many countries has been 
supplied early on by specialized (often state-owned) institutions. These results, omitted here for 
conciseness, are available from the authors. 
14 Alternatively, we use the ratio of foreign to total banks. We refer the reader to Levy Yeyati and Micco 
(2003) for the results using this indicator. 
15 See Bikker and Haaf (2001a).   10
or the efficiency hypothesis, according to which factor they assume to be the main driver 
of superior market performance.
16 Its application to the banking industry has been 
criticized, however, for the one-way causality (from market structure to market 
performance) implicit in the original model.
17 New developments in industrial 
organization and the refinement of formal models of imperfectly competitive markets, as 
well as the realization of the need to endogenize the market structure, led recent empirical 
work to rely increasingly on non-structural models.
18 Among the latter, in this paper we 
apply Panzar and Rosse’s (PR) approach, which has been used in several studies to test 
competition for the European banking industry.
19 
The PR model starts by assuming profit maximizing individual banks, from which 
it derives a first order condition for profit maximization of the type: 
 
R’i (OUTi, n, BSFi, rev) = C’i (OUTi, FIPi, BSFi, cost) 
 
where OUT is output, n is the number of banks, FIP denotes factor input prices, and 
BSFi,rev and BSFi,rev are bank-specific factors affecting the banks’ revenue and cost 
functions, respectively. Under these conditions, PR show that the sum of the elasticities 




















is zero or negative under monopoly, or under monopolistic competition without entry.
20 
In these two previous cases, it can be shown that, if the bank faces a demand with 
constant elasticity e > 1 and a Cobb-Douglas technology, H = 1 - e, and the magnitude of 
                                                       
16 These drivers are, for the SCP, the collusive behavior among large players in a highly concentrated 
market, and for the efficiency hypothesis, the presence of economies of scale that enhance the efficiency of 
large firms. 
17 See Gilbert (1984) and Vesala (1995). For a survey of the literature applying the SCP to the banking 
industry see Gilbert (1984) and Molyneux, Lloyd-Williams and Thornton (1994). 
18 There are three main non-structural models proposed in the literature: Iwata’s (1974), Bresnahan’s 
(1982) and Panzar and Rosse’s (1987) models. Of these, Iwata’s model has not yet been applied to the 
banking industry, due to the lack of micro data needed for empirical estimation. Variations on Bresnahan’s 
conjectural variation approach applied to developing countries include Barajas, Steiner and Salazar (1999) 
on Colombia, Nakane (2001) on Brazil and Burdisso, Catena and D’Amato (2001) on Argentina. 
19 Bikker and Haaf (2001b) present a summary of early studies and results. 
20 See also Vesala (1995) for a formal derivation.   11
H can be interpreted as an inverse measure of the degree of monopolistic power 
(alternatively, a measure of the degree of competition).  
Based on the comparative statics properties of the Chamberlinian equilibrium, and 
under the assumption that the market is in long-run equilibrium, so that the zero profit 
constraint: 
 
R*i (OUT*, n*, BSF rev) = C*i (OUT*, FIP, BSF cost). 
 
holds at the market level, PR shows that 0 < H ≤ 1 under monopolistic competition 
(arguably a more realistic characterization of banks’ interaction). On the other hand, 
perfect competition, obtained as the limiting case of Chamberlinian competition with 
perfect product substitutability, corresponds to H = 1. Thus, values significantly different 
from zero or one would indicate monopolistic competition.  
Most of the studies based on PR have computed a single country-specific H 
parameter for the whole period of analysis, to test whether the market exhibits a conduct 
consistent with a monopoly or with perfect competition. The exceptions are Molyneux, 
Lloyd-Williams and Thornton (1994) and Bikker and Haaf (2001b) for developed 
countries, and Gelos and Roldós (2002) for developing ones. In the first case, H is 
estimated for each year and found to be rather volatile over time, possibly because of the 
low precision associated with a year-by-year estimation. To address this concern, Bikker 
and Haaf (2002) use the full period but correct for the possibility of an evolving market 
structure by multiplying the elasticities from which H is computed by a continuous time-
curve.
21 Finally, Gelos and Roldós (2002) test for structural breaks over the period.  
Estimating parameter changes over time is key to the purposes of our paper for 
two reasons. From a methodological perspective, the parameter H depends on industry-
specific characteristics.
22 Thus, by extension, it is not easy to see to what extent cross-
country variations reveal differences in long-run equilibrium. As a result, a simple cross-
                                                       
21 This correction may be subject to criticism inasmuch as the evolution of the parameter H may not be 
monotonic as the correction assumes. Moreover, the time-variation is often not statistically significant. 
22 As Bresnahan (1989) puts it when defining the four main elements characterizing the New Industrial 
Organization approach on which the PR model is based: “Individual industries are taken to have important 
idiosyncrasies. It is likely that institutional detail at the industry level will affect firms’ conduct and even 
more likely that it will affect the analysts measurement strategy. Thus practitioners in this literature are 
skeptical of using comparative statistics of variations across industries or markets as revealing anything, 
except when the markets are closely related.”    12
country comparison is likely to lead to misleading conclusions unless other country-
specific characteristics are controlled for. A closer look at within-country parameter 
changes, by contrast, is more likely to provide useful information about the evolution of 
competition and its determinants. 
From a practical perspective, on the other hand, since our interest lies in the 
correlation between the consolidation and foreign penetration trends and the evolution of 
competition, our emphasis lies clearly on the dynamic, as opposed to the cross-section, 
dimension. With this in mind, and in order to avoid imposing restrictions on the way the 
parameter changes while maximizing precision, we compute time-varying Hs using 
observations for the whole period. More precisely, we adopt the following standard 









it y it y it y i it X BSF OI PCE PPE AFR FINR ν λ ξ η δ γ β α + + + + + + + = ∑ ∑ ∑ ln ln ln ln ln ln
where: 
 
•  βy , γy, δy, are set to 0 if quarter t does not belong to year y 
•  FINR = ratio of total financial revenue to total assets 
•  AFR = ratio of annual interest expenses to total funds, or the Average Funding Rate 
•  PPE = ratio of personnel expenses to the total balance sheet, or the (approximated) 
Price of Personnel Expenses 
•  PCE = ratio of physical capital expenditure and other expenses to fixed assets, or the 
(approximated) Price of Capital Expenditure 
•  BSF = bank-specific exogenous factors (fundamentals), lagged one quarter, reflecting 
differences in risks, costs, and size of the bank: 
o  risk component, proxied by equity (EQ) and loans (LO) ratios, and by the 
liquidity (CASH) ratio, all normalized by total assets 
o  differences in the deposit mix, captured by demand deposits from 
customers to total customer and short-term funding (DDC) 
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o  size, proxied by the log of total real assets (LASSETS), where assets are 
deflated by the CPI 
•  OI = ratio of Other Income to the Total Balance Sheet 
•  X = time-variant macroeconomic factors such as the reference interest rate (INT) and 
the inflation rate (INF) 
 
In turn, we estimate competition as H defined, for each year y, as the sum of the 
elasticities of the reduced-form revenues with respect to factor prices:  
 
y y y y H δ γ β + + =  
 
Measures of Bank Risk 
 
We measure solvency risk as the probability that losses exceed the bank’s equity capital 























where ROA is bank returns on assets, E is equity capital over total assets, and µROA and 
σ
2
ROA are the mean and variance of the distribution of ROA.  
  Thus, the variable Z defined above is a proxy for the probability of insolvency of 
the bank or, more precisely, the probability of a negative shock to profits that forces the 
bank to default. A smaller Z (a larger risk exposure) can be associated with narrower 
returns (due, for instance, to greater inefficiency or reduced market power), larger return 
volatility (due to poorer diversification or a less conservative choice of investments), or 
higher leverage (due to lower capitalization). For the tests reported below, we compute 
bank-specific Zs based on quarterly balance sheet data from the last three years.
24   
 
                                                       
23 See Roy (1959). 
24 For empirical applications of the Z index, see, among others, De Nicoló (2000) and De Nicoló, Honohan 
and Ize (2003).   14
3. Econometric Results 
 
Our empirical testing proceeds in four steps. First, we estimate our measure of 
competition, the parameter H, for each year as well as for the period as a whole, 
according to our baseline specification. Second, we test whether and how this parameter 
correlates with the evolution of bank concentration and foreign participation over time. 
Next, we regress bank returns on the competition measure to check whether a more 
competitive environment, as measured by an increase in H, is reflected, as expected, in 
narrower margins and lower returns. Finally, we examine the link between concentration 
and foreign participation, on the one hand, and banking stability, as proxied by bank-
specific Zs, on the other. 
 
Concentration, Foreign Penetration and Competition 
 
In Tables 2a-b, we report OLS estimates of a time-invariant H for each country, as well 
as weighted least squared (WLS) estimates where observations are weighted by the 
banks’ asset share.
25 The former is closer to other estimates reported in the literature and 
is presented here for comparison. While most of the previous studies tend to focus on 
large banks, our data set includes all banks in the system. Therefore, the WLS procedure, 
by weighting larger banks more heavily, captures better the behavior of the representative 
bank, while making our findings comparable with those in the literature. WLS has a 
couple of additional advantages. First, by using banks’ asset share as weights, we can 
read our results as reflecting the average level of competition faced by borrowers in the 
system. Second, under the reasonable assumption that measurement errors are decreasing 
with bank size, WLS yield more precise estimates. Finally, if banks’ behavior (in 
particular, their exercise of market power) differs significantly with size, the evolution of 
an unweighted estimate of H may be spuriously reflecting changes in the size distribution 
as a result of the consolidation process.  
Reassuringly, OLS and WLS coefficients are comparable and of the expected 
sign, although estimates of H tend to be slightly higher using WLS. The perfect 
competition (H = 1) and monopoly (H = 0) hypotheses are rejected at conventional levels 
                                                       
25 Time-invariant Hs are calculated by setting βy = β, γy = γ , and δy  = δ for all y.   15
for all countries. Time-invariant Hs reported at the bottom of the table are directly 
comparable with similar estimates found in the literature. Interestingly, our estimates of 
H for Latin American countries do not differ in range and cross-country variability for 
those found in more developed countries. However, as noted, cross-country comparisons 
of the H indicator can be highly misleading.  
We henceforth center our analysis on the results that can be inferred from the 
dynamic dimension, for which we need to measure the evolution of the H parameter. 
WLS estimates of time-varying Hs are presented in Table 3.
26 As can be seen, while the 
parameter is relatively stable and comparable with the time-invariant estimates, it still 
shows some variation over time. At this preliminary level, one thing to note is the fact 
that, with the exceptions of Mexico and El Salvador, all banking sectors appear to have 
moved towards more competition in recent years, suggesting that consolidation has not 
inflicted serious damage in terms of non-competitive practices. 
Estimates of H can be directly used to address the link between changes in 
concentration and foreign penetration, on the one hand, and changes in competition, on 
the other. A first glance at the data is presented in Table 4, where we report simple 
correlations between H, measures of concentration (CR3,  CR5 and HHI) and foreign 
participation (FASSETS), measured in terms of assets, for the full eight-country sample.
27 
As can be seen in the table, none of the correlation coefficients is statistically significant, 
possibly due to the wide cross-country variation of H.  
A more rigorous look is presented in Table 5, where we report the results from 
panel regressions of H on different measures of concentration and foreign penetration. 
Once we control for country fixed effects and time trends (alternatively, time dummies), 
we find that, while changes in concentration seem to exert no significant influence on H, 
foreign participation shows a negative and significant correlation with competition.  
                                                       
26 Coefficients for other controls are similar to those reported in the previous table and are omitted for 
brevity. Complete regression results are available from the authors. 
27 Note that the concentration indices can be rewritten as a function of the size distribution and the number 
of banks. For example, HHI = (µ2 + 1) / n, where µ 2 is the variation coefficient of the size distribution, and 
n is the number of banks. As a result, they tend to be inversely correlated with the number of banks (or, 
more generally, with the banking sector depth, independently of the distribution of bank size), suggesting 
that both the index and the number of banks should be used to control for the distribution. Hence, we 
included the number of banks as an alternative explanatory factor here as well as in the next table.   16
  Since the previous results rely heavily on our measure of competition, it is 
important to verify that this measure yields results that are at least consistent with what 
one would expect the influence of competition to be. To do that, we explore the link 
between  H and bank returns, with the prior that increases in competition should be 
reflected in narrowing intermediation margins and, through this, in declining bank profits.  
Pooling our bank-level panel data for the eight countries in our sample, we run a 
regression of private bank returns on competition (H) controlling for bank fixed effects 
and time trend (alternatively, time effects). It is important to note that, since our 
competition measure (H) is the same for all banks in each country at any given year, our 
bank-year observations are independent across countries and years but not across banks 
within any country-year pair, so that standard errors need to be computed clustered by 
country.  
Table 6 reports the results.
28 As the table shows, H is indeed significantly and 
negatively correlated with returns of assets (ROA).
29 The result is robust to the inclusion 
of additional macroeconomic controls such as GDP growth and exchange rate volatility 
(column 3).
30 
As an alternative way to check the robustness of our finding of a negative link 
between foreign penetration and competition, in column (4) we include our measure of 
foreign participation, FASSETS. As expected, once changes in competition are controlled 
for, the influence of foreign participation is not significant. However, once the direct 
measure of competition is excluded (column (5)), the coefficient of FASSETS becomes 
four times larger and significant, reflecting its negative impact on competition and, 
through it, its positive impact on returns. 
To test whether the previous effect is due to above-market returns for foreign 
banks or to positive spillovers on incumbent domestic banks, in columns (6)-(8) we 
include a foreign ownership dummy (DFOR). Since foreign banks in Latin America tend 
to be relatively large, the foreign dummy may be spuriously capturing size rather than 
                                                       
28 We exclude state-owned banks because they are less affected by market conditions. Most results are 
robust to their inclusion. 
29 The columns show regressions results using a time trend and time dummies, respectively. 
30 Real GDP growth is expected to be positively correlated with returns, as expansions improve loan 
performance and reduce loss provisions. The second one, measured as the standard deviation of the   17
ownership. To avoid this potential omitted variable problem, we also include the log of 
real assets (LASSETS) to control for bank size.  
The foreign dummy has the opposite sign and is not significant, even after 
dropping bank effects (columns (7) and (8)). On the other hand, the results on foreign 
participation remain virtually unchanged, confirming that its influence on returns is not 
specific to foreign banks but rather works through its general impact on competition. This 
result is consistent with the view that, either by introducing new and more sophisticated 
products or, in the particular case of developing countries, simply by exploiting their 
brand name, foreign banks increase product differentiation and, through this channel, the 
scope for oligopolistic practices.   
As a final check, we rerun the previous regressions substituting returns on equity 
(ROE) for returns on assets. The underlying hypothesis is that ROE, rather than ROA, 
should better capture the presence of non-competitive profits in the industry. Indeed, the 
results appear to confirm this view, as can be seen by comparing column (9) with column 
(4), and column (11) with column (8). In both cases, the coefficients of H improve their 
significance level. The same is true for foreign participation when the competition 
measure is excluded in column (10). 
Thus, the two main findings of this section appear to be quite robust: i) foreign 
participation is associated with weaker competition, and ii) bank returns are, as expected, 
negatively related to the degree of competition and, through the previous channel, 
positively related to foreign participation.  
 
Foreign Penetration and Banking Stability 
 
We turn next to the impact of foreign penetration on banking stability, which we test by 
running bank-level regressions of our measure of bank risk, Z, against the share of 
foreign assets and the degree of competition as captured by H. We also include, as before, 
controls for real growth and exchange rate volatility (both measured over the three-year 
period over which the Z-score is computed). Finally, we control for bank fixed effects in 
all specifications except in columns (6)-(8) where we replace bank effects by a proxy for 
                                                                                                                                                              
nominal exchange rate over the past three years, is a proxy for nominal instability that we expect to be 
negatively correlated with returns. Coefficients are significant and of the correct sign in most cases.     18
bank size and a foreign ownership dummy. All regressions include either a time trend or 
time dummies.  
Table 7 reports the results. The macroeconomic controls have the expected sign 
(economic growth reduces bank risk whereas exchange rate volatility increases it) and are 
significant in most cases. Competition, in turn, increases bank risk, while the coefficients 
of bank concentration (measured here as CR3) and foreign participation fail to be 
significant.  
As before, the results bear the question of whether the incidence of foreign 
penetration on risk confirms its reported impact on competition. To tackle this question, 
in columns (4) and (5) we replicate the exercise in columns (1) and (3), this time 
excluding the competition measure. As expected, the coefficient of foreign competition is 
positive and larger than before, albeit not significant.  
To explore this link further, in columns (6)-(8) we replace bank effects with a 
foreign ownership dummy and a size variable. This time, the positive link between 
foreign penetration and risk is positive and significant when the competition indicator is 
dropped in column (8). Interestingly, the foreign dummy is negative and strongly 
significant in both cases, suggesting that, while foreign penetration tends to increase the 
market power of the representative bank, foreign banks are individually characterized by 
a higher risk profile than their national counterparts. The results in this table are robust to 
the use of a semi-logarithmic specification (Table 7b).  
How specific is this higher risk profile to foreign banks and where is it coming 
from? We examine this issue more closely in Table 8, where we run regressions of Z and 
its individual components on a foreign bank dummy, a size variable, and a country-year 
fixed effect that controls for all country-specific (time-varying or invariant) effects. The 
results confirm the previous finding in a quite general way. Column (1) shows that the Z-
score is significantly higher for foreign banks. Expected returns on assets, however, are 
not influenced by foreign ownership (column (2)), in line with results in Table 6. By 
contrast, columns (3) and (4) show that foreign banks exhibit higher leverage ratios and   19
greater return volatility than national banks. The same is true when we use a semi-
logarithmic specification (columns (5)-(7)).
31  
It is possible that, since many foreign banks entered the Latin American market 
purchasing formerly national banks in distress, these findings may be capturing the 
transitorily higher risk of the recently acquired bank. To test this hypothesis, in columns 
(8) and (9) we revise our foreign dummy to single out banks that were owned by foreign 
institutions at least for four and five years (that is, were acquired one and two years 
before the beginning of the period over which Z is computed). The results confirm our 
previous findings in both cases: foreign banks appear to be associated with a higher risk 
profile, due to higher leverage ratios and more volatile returns. 
Returning to the link between foreign penetration and banking sector fragility, in 
Table 9 we report results of country-level regressions in which we review (and confirm) 
the findings in Table 7. The table presents the results based on three alternative measures 
of country-specific banking sector fragility: the weighted average of Z and that of its log, 
and the Z based on aggregate data for the system as a whole (System Z), which broadly 
corresponds to systemic risk (that is, risk that cannot be diversified away within the 
banking sector). Controls for country and year effects are always included.  
The coefficients display the expected sign, with risk positively correlated with 
economic growth and negatively correlated with exchange rate volatility. Concentration, 
once again, has no influence on bank risk. Size, on the contrary, is positively related with 
large (and presumably more diversified) banks exhibiting lower risk profiles. Foreign 
penetration, in turn, is positively and significantly correlated with risk only through its 
effect on competition. Once H is included, the coefficient of foreign penetration ceases to 
be significant and even turns negative in some cases. For all three banking fragility 
measures the results are comparable, although System Z appears to be the less sensitive to 
the presence of foreign banks. In sum, we can conclude that, while foreign banks in Latin 
America are characteristically more risky than the rest, foreign penetration was 
accompanied by a decline in competition that, possibly through the disciplining effect of 
                                                       
31 Here, we report the log of the whole numerator, Log (µROA + EQ/A), to avoid missing observations due to 
negative returns. Regressions using Log (µROA) as dependent variable yield similar results at the expense of 
a smaller sample. Results are available from the authors.   20
a higher charter value due to increased profitability, exerted a positive influence on 




In this paper, we used a detailed balance sheet database for eight Latin American banking 
sectors to explore the consequences of the recent consolidation and internationalization 
process on competition and banking sector fragility. We found that increased 
concentration appears to have had no influence in either front. On the contrary, we found 
that foreign penetration weakened banking competition, that the latter is negatively 
related with bank risk and that, as a result of the previous two findings, foreign 
penetration has indeed induced lower levels of risk. Somewhat surprisingly, these lower 
risk levels were not driven by the presence of safer foreign banks. Indeed, foreign-owned 
banks in Latin American markets are found to be more risky than national banks, due to 
higher leverage ratios and more variable returns.  
The evidence presented here suggests an interpretation. In recurrently shaken 
emerging Latin American markets, national banks may be seen as imperfect substitutes of 
foreign branches or subsidiaries, because of actual differences in their menu of products 
as well as in terms of the value of the brand name and the perception of an implicit 
insurance provided by their parents. If so, by increasing the degree of product 
differentiation, foreign penetration in emerging economies would reduce competition 
and, through higher profits and charter value, the representative bank’s risk appetite, 
notwithstanding the fact that foreign banks can reap these oligopolistic rents while 
choosing a higher risk profile. Reconciling the findings of this paper along these or 
alternative lines appears a fruitful topic for future research.  
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        Source: National Superintendencies of Banks. 
    * In 1994 there were 19 banks. 
 
 
  1996 2002 Change  %Change 
Argentina 117  80  -37  -32% 
Brazil 253  177  -76  -30% 
Chile 31  25  -6  -18% 
Colombia 39  27  -12  -31% 
Costa Rica  30  21  -9  -29% 
Mexico* 40  32  -9  -21% 
Peru 22  15  -7  -32% 
El Salvador 18 13 -5 -28%   26
Table 2-a. Estimates of Time-Invariant H 
(Bank-level panel data, OLS) 
 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
* significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent. 
1All coefficients are significantly different from zero at 1 percent and significantly different from 1 at 1 
percent. 
  Argentina Brazil  Chile  Colombia Costa  Rica  Mexico  Peru  El  
Salvador 
AFR  0.221  0.653  0.502 0.443 0.613  0.644  0.323  0.434 
  (0.047)***  (0.018)***  (0.035)*** (0.036)*** (0.029)***  (0.025)***  (0.035)***  (0.029)*** 
PPE  0.213  0.188  0.278 0.015 0.068  0.058  0.284  -0.030 
 (0.043)***  (0.018)***  (0.048)***  (0.033)  (0.026)***  (0.024)**  (0.036)***  (0.053) 
PCE  0.025  0.048  0.041 0.112 -0.004  -0.008  0.011  0.015 
  (0.021)  (0.005)***  (0.019)** (0.023)***  (0.009) (0.011) (0.016)  (0.031) 
OI  0.004 -0.020  -0.032 -0.004 -0.032  0.005  -0.024  0.018 
 (0.021)  (0.006)***  (0.008)***  (0.008)  (0.017)*  (0.021)  (0.011)**  (0.012) 
EQ  0.048  -0.047  0.220 0.054 -0.071  0.043  -0.233  0.045 
 (0.028)*  (0.022)**  (0.034)***  (0.023)**  (0.022)***  (0.031)  (0.035)***  (0.060) 
LO  0.285  0.001  0.074 0.050 0.085  0.041  0.410  0.267 
 (0.060)***  (0.008)  (0.022)***  (0.083)  (0.027)***  (0.021)*  (0.077)***  (0.098)*** 
DDC 0.056  0.021  0.040  -0.016  0.001  -0.004  -0.025  0.037 
  (0.017)***  (0.005)***  (0.021)*  (0.011)  (0.003) (0.011) (0.012)**  (0.019)* 
CASH  -0.028  0.000  -0.001 -0.118 -0.020  -0.000  0.041  -0.006 
  (0.009)***  (0.000)  (0.000)*** (0.026)*** (0.018)  (0.000)***  (0.051)  (0.046) 
LASSETS 0.010  0.044  0.012  -0.115  -0.069  0.013  -0.077  0.023 
 (0.029)  (0.022)**  (0.033)  (0.037)***  (0.014)***  (0.040)  (0.019)***  (0.037) 
INT  0.048  0.002  -0.002  0.005  0.001 0.006 -0.000  0.002 
 (0.006)***  (0.001)***  (0.001)  (0.001)***  (0.002)  (0.002)***  (0.001)  (0.003) 
INF  -2.610  1.506  5.403 0.453 0.374  -0.520  1.076  0.815 
  (1.271)**  (0.390)***  (1.636)***  (0.242)*  (0.239) (0.529) (0.480)**  (0.711) 
Constant  -1.662  -0.596  0.216 0.565 0.313  -0.733  -0.647  -1.834 
  (0.272)***  (0.316)*  (0.341) (0.556) (0.241)  (0.188)***  (0.195)***  (0.582)*** 
Observa-
tions  2337  4808  968 831 716  832  766  326 
R-squared  0.740  0.820  0.962 0.825 0.932  0.923  0.912  0.898 
H 
1  0.460  0.889  0.821 0.570 0.677  0.695  0.618  0.418   27
Table 2-b. Estimates of Time-Invariant H 
(Bank-level panel data, WLS) 
 
  Argentina Brazil  Chile  Colombia Costa  Rica  Mexico  Peru  El 
 Salvador 
AFR  0.327 0.778 0.591 0.436 0.555 0.740 0.398 0.490 
  (0.047)*** (0.014)*** (0.043)*** (0.031)*** (0.018)*** (0.023)*** (0.019)*** (0.026)*** 
PPE  0.191 0.075 0.186 0.051 0.081 0.106 0.233 0.077 
  (0.044)*** (0.052)  (0.066)*** (0.030)*  (0.029)*** (0.028)*** (0.036)*** (0.041)* 
PCE  0.013 0.070 0.102 0.111 0.019 -0.026  0.009 0.061 
  (0.022) (0.010)***  (0.033)***  (0.032)***  (0.010)* (0.012)**  (0.023)  (0.032)* 
OI  0.048  -0.026 -0.004 -0.007 -0.035 0.046  0.010  0.016 
  (0.027)* (0.011)**  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.018)* (0.015)***  (0.012)  (0.011) 
EQ  0.071 -0.042  0.152 0.093 -0.212  0.008 -0.164  0.033 
  (0.023)*** (0.021)**  (0.034)*** (0.026)*** (0.033)*** (0.027)  (0.036)*** (0.041) 
LO  0.237 -0.015  0.077 0.008 0.164 -0.033  0.391 0.321 
  (0.051)*** (0.011)  (0.033)**  (0.066)  (0.021)*** (0.024)  (0.052)*** (0.059)*** 
DDC  0.030 0.011 0.074 -0.008  -0.003  0.039 -0.034  0.053 
  (0.024) (0.007) (0.030)**  (0.014) (0.008) (0.008)***  (0.018)*  (0.020)*** 
CASH  -0.010 -0.000 -0.001 -0.102 -0.048 -0.000 0.270  0.065 
  (0.002)*** (0.000)**  (0.000)*** (0.030)*** (0.032) (0.000)***  (0.082)***  (0.071) 
LASSETS  0.004  -0.123 -0.028 -0.063 -0.117 0.044  -0.095 0.045 
  (0.024) (0.031)***  (0.035) (0.043) (0.022)*** (0.023)*  (0.020)*** (0.031) 
INT  0.025 -0.002  -0.004  0.005 0.001 0.001 -0.000  -0.002 
  (0.005)*** (0.001)*  (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)   28
Table 2-b., continued 
 
   Argentina        Brazil  Chile  Colombia  Costa Rica  Mexico  Peru  El 
 Salvador 
INF  -1.078 -0.520 4.920 0.834 0.147 0.443 0.281 0.188
  (1.071)  (0.680) (1.848)*** (0.284)*** (0.337) (0.304) (0.414) (0.402)
      
Constant  -1.016 2.261 1.047 -0.007 1.069 0.059 -0.075 -1.248
  (0.276)***  (0.457)*** (0.439)** (0.671) (0.421)** (0.186) (0.247) (0.456)***
      
Observations  2,337 4,808 968 968 716 832 766 326
R-squared 0.7810 0.9399 0.9777 0.8787 0.9497 0.9582 0.8895 0.9253
H
1  0.5315  0.9229
3 0.8794
2 0.5982 0.6553 0.8194 0.6405 0.6281
      
      
      
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
* significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent. 
1 H = 0 (monopoly), and H = 1 (perfect competition) rejected at the 1 percent significance level unless otherwise indicated. 
2 Significantly different from 1 at 5 percent. 
3 Significantly different from 1 at 20 percent.. 
Note: Observations are weighted using banks’ assets share. 
.   29
Table 3. Estimates of Time-Varying H (WLS) 
 
 Argentina  Brazil  Chile  Colombia  Costa  
Rica  Mexico Peru  El  
Salvador 
1993             0.512   
1994     0.856      0.830  0.544   
1995 0.482  0.811 0.909  0.552  0.636 0.864  0.535   
1996 0.507  0.847 0.878  0.515  0.626 0.864  0.529   
1997 0.521  0.859 0.871  0.520  0.625 0.850  0.535  0.695 
1998 0.517  0.860 0.841  0.564  0.651 0.866  0.563  0.674 
1999 0.504  0.842 0.900  0.576  0.667 0.814  0.582  0.703 
2000 0.501  0.837 0.836  0.582  0.642 0.805  0.550  0.719 
2001   0.828 0.851  0.571  0.645 0.792  0.588  0.734 
2002   0.859 0.870  0.591  0.641 0.800  0.568  0.672 
Average 0.506  0.843  0.868  0.559  0.642  0.832  0.551 0.699 
St. Dev.  0,014  0,017  0,025  0,028  0,014  0,030  0,024  0,025 
















In all cases, H = 0 (monopoly), and H = 1 (perfect competition) are rejected at the 5 percent significance level, based on robust standard errors.  
Note: Observations are weighted using banks’ assets share.   30
 
Table 4. Concentration, Foreign Penetration and Competition Measures—Correlation Matrix 
 
  H  CR5  CR3  HHI FASSETS 
H  1      
       
CR5  0.040 1     
  (0.754)      
CR3  -0.018 0.993  1    
  (0.886) (0.000)      
HHI  -0.070  0.975 0.980 1   
  (0.581) (0.000) (0.000)    
FASSETS  0.101  -0.194 -0.261 -0.255 1 
    (0.429) (0.124) (0.038) (0.042)  
Note: p-values in parentheses. 
   31
 
 
Table 5. Concentration, Foreign Penetration and Competition 
(Country-level panel data) 
 
  H 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
(1) 
Log # Banks  -0.017  -0.003  -0.002  -0.009    -0.052  0.004 
 (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.021)    (0.027)*  (0.027) 
FASSETS   -0.095  -0.095  -0.091  -0.096  -0.096  -0.104 
   (0.030)***  (0.031)***  (0.032)***  (0.031)***  (0.029)***  (0.035)*** 
CR3  0.008 0.014      0.018  0.032  0.052 
  (0.094) (0.099)      (0.078)  (0.093)  (0.095) 
CR5     0.017         
     (0.093)         
HHI       -0.103       
       (0.254)       
Year 0.001  0.006  0.006  0.005  0.006    0.006 
   (0.002)  (0.002)**  (0.002)***  (0.002)**  (0.002)***    (0.002)** 
Observations 64  64  64  64  64  64  64 
R-squared 0.98  0.98  0.98  0.98  0.98  0.98  0.98 
Fixed  effects Country Country  Country  Country Country Country  and  Year  Country 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
* significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent. 
1 Estimated using robust regression (see Hamilton, 1994). 
   32
Table 6. Concentration and Bank Returns 
(Bank-Level Panel Data, WLS) 
 
  ROA    ROE 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)  (8)   (9) (10)  (11) 
 H  -3.632 -3.561  -3.403  -3.225        -2.989    -30.396   -28.480 
  (1.485)** (1.255)*** (1.593)**  (1.795)*      (1.355)**    (13.418)**    (10.576)***
 ∆log (GDP)     1.632 1.700 1.960 1.782 1.999  1.793   11.372 13.793 11.805 
     (0.808)** (0.735)** (0.968)** (1.122) (1.044)* (0.867)**    (6.800)* (9.134)  (7.269) 
 σER     -0.260 -0.261 -0.349 -0.336 -0.359  -0.270   -2.075 -2.903 -1.940 
     (0.066)*** (0.066)*** (0.069)*** (0.065)*** (0.074)***  (0.072)***   (0.675)*** (0.815)*** (0.664)*** 
FASSETS        0.097 0.434 0.424 0.335  0.015   2.186 5.363 1.705 
       (0.214) (0.183)**  (0.242)*  (0.155)**  (0.197)   (2.376) (2.006)***  (2.218) 
DFOR           -0.043 -0.038  -0.039     -0.261 
           (0.073) (0.031)  (0.031)     (0.365) 
LASSETS           -0.080 0.039  0.038      0.580 
           (0.171) (0.033)  (0.032)     (0.284)** 
Year 0.007    0.012 0.008 -0.006 0.002 0.010  0.024    0.001 -0.131  0.103 
 (0.015)    (0.012) (0.020) (0.020) (0.034) (0.019)  (0.022)   (0.207) (0.186) (0.208) 
Observations  2331  2331 2331 2331 2331 2331 2331  2331   2328 2328 2328 
R-squared  0.46  0.48 0.47 0.47 0.45 0.45 0.07  0.08   0.50 0.48 0.14 
Fixed effects  Bank  Bank and 
Year  Bank Bank Bank Bank Country  Country    Bank Bank Country 
Robust errors clustered by country in parentheses. * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent.  
Note: Z is computed based on quarterly data over the last three years. Observations are weighted using banks’ assets share at the country level (each country has 
the same weight in the regressions). ROE and ROA are measured in percentage points and exclude the 2% tails. σER is the standard deviation of monthly 
exchange rate changes over the previous three years. DFOR takes the value 1 whenever a bank has been foreign-owned for (at least) the last year. By 
construction Bank fixed effect includes country fixed effect.   33
Table 7-a. Concentration and Banking Fragility 
(Bank-level panel data, WLS) 
 
  Z 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5)  (6) (7) (8) 
H  -22.030 -20.893 -19.193     -17.031 -13.198  
  (11.054)** (9.632)**  (10.660)*      (8.564)**  (7.963)*   
FASSETS_AVG  -0.406 -0.226 0.179  2.744  2.955  0.747  1.589  3.519 
  (2.114) (1.898) (1.741) (2.829)  (2.529)  (1.601) (1.387) (1.737)** 
∆log (GDP)  0.079 0.087 0.091 0.117  0.131  0.110 0.132 0.162 
  (0.056) (0.054) (0.066) (0.049)**  (0.056)**  (0.046)**  (0.054)**  (0.048)*** 
 σER  -0.604 -0.643 -0.998 -0.606  -1.147  -0.612 -1.144 -1.280 
  (0.339)* (0.323)**  (0.446)**  (0.428)  (0.056)**  (0.321)* (0.415)***  (0.446)*** 
CR3_AVG   -4.101          
   (7.087)          
DFOR_3         -0.553  -0.539  -0.552 
         (0.190)***  (0.178)***  (0.171)*** 
LASSETS_AVG         0.414  0.417  0.416 
         (0.148)***  (0.151)***  (0.153)*** 
Year  -0.085 -0.082   -0.228    -0.139    
   (0.169) (0.148)   (0.225)    (0.128)    
Observations  2279 2279 2279 2279  2279  2261 2261 2261 
R-squared  0.78 0.78 0.78 0.76  0.77  0.39 0.40 0.40 
Fixed effects  Bank  Bank  Bank and Year Bank  Bank and Year Country  Country & Year Country & Year 
Robust errors clustered by country in parentheses. * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent. 
Note: Z is computed based on the last three years, excluding observations from the 2% tails of ROA. Observations are weighted using banks’ assets share at the 
country level (each country has the same weight in the regressions). All control variables are measured based on the three-year period over which Z is computed. 
LASSETS_AVG : average of the log of bank assets. FASSETS_AVG: average share of foreign-owned over total bank assets. ∆log (GDP): cumulative growth. σER: 
standard deviation of monthly exchange rate changes. DFOR_3: dummy that takes the value 1 whenever a bank has been foreign-owned for (at least) the last 
three years.   34
Table 7-b. Concentration and Banking Fragility 
(Bank-level panel data, WLS) 
 
 Log(Z) 
  (1) (2)  (3)  (4) (5) 
H  -12.194 -7.757  -5.861   
  (4.505)*** (3.158)**  (2.533)**   
FASSETS_AVG  0.271 0.835  1.116  1.874 1.923 
  (1.071) (0.734)  (0.607)*  (1.379) (0.626)*** 
￿log (GDP) 0.039  0.069  0.074  0.059 0.087 
  (0.031) (0.019)***  (0.019)***  (0.026)** (0.014)*** 
 ￿ER -0.329  -0.352  -0.553  -0.321 -0.606 
  (0.157)** (0.150)**  (0.208)***  (0.240) (0.237)** 
CR3_AVG         
         
DFOR_3   -0.260  -0.255    -0.258 
   (0.105)**  (0.104)**    (0.102)** 
LASSETS_AVG   0.221  0.223    0.224 
   (0.064)***  (0.067)***    (0.068)*** 
Year  -0.051 -0.070    -0.121   
   (0.085) (0.052)    (0.102)   
Observations  1896 1883  1883  1896 1883 
R-squared  0.76 0.37  0.38  0.74 0.37 
Fixed effects  Bank  Country  Country & Year  Bank  Country & Year 
 
Robust errors clustered by country in parentheses. * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent. 
Note: log(Z) is computed based on the last three years, excluding observations from the 2% tails of ROA. Observations are weighted using banks’ assets share at 
the country level (each country has the same weight in the regressions). All control variables are measured based on the three-year period over which Z is 
computed. LASSETS_AVG : average of the log of bank assets. FASSETS_AVG: average share of foreign-owned over total bank assets. ∆log (GDP): cumulative 
growth. σER: standard deviation of monthly exchange rate changes. DFOR_3: dummy that takes the value 1 whenever a bank has been foreign-owned for (at 
least) the last three years.   35
Table 8. Concentration and Banking Fragility – Z-Components 
(Bank-level panel data, WLS) 
 
  Z    ROA    EQ/A    σROA    Log (Z)    Log (µROA + µEQ/A)    Log (σROA)    Z 
  (1)    (2)    (3)    (4)    (5)    (6)    (7)    (8) (9) 
DFOR_3  -0.551            0.059    -0.271    -0.133    0.169      
  (0.113)***            (0.020)***    (0.066)***    (0.056)**    (0.042)***      
LASSETS_AVG  0.398            -0.116    0.215    0.043    -0.196    0.360 0.362 
 (0.039)***            (0.007)***    (0.022)***    (0.020)**    (0.014)***    (0.042)*** (0.042)*** 
DFOR_1      -0.039    -0.014                      
      (0.032)    (0.004)***                      
LASSETS      0.036    -0.014                      
      (0.012)***    (0.001)***                      
DFOR_4                              -0.417  
                              (0.122)***  
DFOR_5                               -0.377 
                               (0.124)*** 
Observations 2261    2331    2331    2287    1883    1886    2287    1811 1811 
R-squared 0.46    0.14    0.26    0.42    0.41    0.33    0.63    0.45 0.45 
Robust errors clustered by country in parentheses. All regressions include fixed effects for each country-year pair. 
* significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent. 
Note: Z, µROA , µEQ/A and σROA are computed based on the last three years excluding extreme values of ROA. Observations are weighted using banks’ 
assets share at the country level (each country has the same weight in the regressions). DFOR_n is a foreign bank dummy that takes the value 1 whenever 
a bank has been foreign-owned for the last n years. LASSETS_AVG computed as the average of the log of bank assets over the last three years. 
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Table 9. Concentration and Banking Fragility 
(Country-level panel data, WLS) 
 
  Z  ln(Z)  System Z 
 (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (13)  (14) 
FASSETS_AVG  2.744 2.872 4.288  0.678 2.014  0.547  5.691  -0.477 
  (1.302)** (1.157)** (1.295)***  (1.417)  (0.576)*** (0.662)  (3.123)*  (4.659) 
∆log (GDP)  0.153 0.164 0.185  0.120 0.085  0.059  0.632  0.512 
  (0.065)** (0.059)** (0.062)***  (0.066)*  (0.020)*** (0.025)**  (0.143)***  (0.165)*** 
 σER  -1.204 -1.383 -1.573  -1.059 -0.705  -0.502  -3.776  -2.630 
  (0.540)** (0.539)** (0.566)***  (0.471)** (0.231)*** (0.183)**  (1.338)***  (1.553) 
CR3_AVG   -7.140            
   (4.271)           
LASSETS_AVG_CTRY    1.268    0.488    3.466   
     (0.536)**    (0.168)***    (1.026)***   
H      -14.206    -5.998    -13.380 
       (7.493)*    (2.663)**    (17.571) 
Observations 47  47  47  47  47  47  47  47 
R-squared 0.83  0.85  0.87  0.85  0.91  0.90  0.91  0.88 
Robust errors clustered by country in parentheses. All regressions include country and year effects. 
* significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent. 
Note: Z is the average Z weighted by bank’s assets share, at the country level. System Z is computed by aggregating bank level data at the country level. 
All control variables are measured based on the three-year period over which Z is computed. LASSETS_AVG_CTRY : country average of LASSETS_AVG 
(defined as the average of the log of bank assets over the last three years). FASSETS_AVG: average share of foreign-owned over total bank assets. ∆log 
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Figure 1. Increase in Bank Concentration (CR5) 
 











*CRI presented a decrease of 10 percent in its C. 
 




Figure 2. Increase in Foreign Participation 
(foreign bank assets over total assets) 
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